FREEDOM ≠ RANGE OF CHOICES

A large range of alternatives (or opportunities or choices) is a necessary condition for freedom — not a sufficient one. Indeed, the choices could all be disvaluable; or some of them could be valuable but their actual choice might be penalized — as is the case with participating in opposition politics in a unidemocratic country.

A society X is _free in the respect_ A iff

(i) $A = \{a_1, \ldots, a_n\}$, with $n > 1$, is a set of alternatives of a kind;

(ii) there is at least one $a_j \in A$, ~~with $1 \leq i \leq n$~~, such that $V_i(a_j) > 0$;

(iii) accepting or choosing a valuable alternative a_j (i.e. the act of choosing a_j) is ~~not disvaluable~~ neither punished nor rewarded:

$$V_e(a_j) = 0$$

, where V_e is the extrinsic or external value ~~assigned to~~

Assumption:

Total value of ~~other~~ choosing alternative a_j:

$$V(a_j^x) = \underset{\uparrow}{V_i(a_{j_x}^x)} + V_e(a_j) \quad \longleftarrow \quad \text{value conferred by environment or society.}$$

value conferred by individual x